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In a tournament, competitors may engage in undesirable activities, or “cheat-
ing”, in order to gain an advantage. Examples of such activities include the
taking of steroids, plagiarism, and “creative accounting”. This paper considers
the problem of deterrence of these activities and ﬁnds that there exist special
considerations that are not present in a traditional model of law enforcement.
For example, an agent’s returns to cheating depend on the cheating decisions
of others, and so there may exist multiple equilibria. The problem of multiple
equilibria can be reduced when the ﬁrst-place prize is awarded to the person
that performed best without cheating. Moreover, we show that re-awarding
prizes reduces the amount of monitoring required to ensure compliance. We
also demonstrate that monitoring costs can be further reduced by monitoring
the winner of the tournament more than the loser, and by manipulating prizes,
including through the introduction of prizes for non-winners.
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1 Introduction
Tournaments are a commonly used mechanism for the allocation of resources. Exam-
ples include promotion tournaments, sporting events, patent races, and the classroom
environment. Indeed, rank-order tournaments have many desirable features, partic-
ularly in the work place1. In a tournament, however, competitors may have the
incentive to engage in activities undesirable to the tournament organizer in order to
gain an advantage. Examples of such activities include the taking of steroids2, plagia-
rism, ballot box stuﬃng, sabotage, falsiﬁcation and creative accounting.3 Recently,
scandals in tournament environments have made headlines, from steroid use in base-
ball, international cycling and the US Olympic track team to Tom Delay’s indictment
for conspiracy to violate election laws in 2002. How to prevent such behaviors has
been deemed of paramount importance, with even the US Congress getting involved
with the issue of steroids in sports.
This paper considers the problem of deterrence of undesirable activities in tourna-
ments, which we shall simply call “cheating”, and ﬁnds that there exist special con-
siderations that are not present in a traditional model of law enforcement. Notably,
in a tournament an agent’s payoﬀ from cheating depends on the cheating decisions
of others, and so there may exist multiple equilibria. Whether multiple equilibria
exist depends in part on the penalty scheme adopted. Speciﬁcally, the nature of the
externality caused by cheating is inﬂuenced by whether an individual ﬁnishing second
1See, for example Bognanno(2001), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Prendergast (1999), and Choi and
Gulati (2004).
2See Preston and Szymanski (2003) for an extensive description of cheating in sports, and Maen-
ning (2003) for a focus on doping and corruption. Finally, Duggan and Levitt (2002) look at
voluntary losing in repeated Sumo wrestling tournaments.
3Prendergast (1999) engages in a general discussion of the last two topics, while Jacob and Levitt
(2003) analyze a special case involving teachers.
1receives the ﬁrst place prize after the winner is found to have cheated. We call such
a penalty scheme re-awarding. If prizes are not re-awarded, then cheating behaviors
are strategic complements. If prizes are re-awarded, then agents’ decisions to cheat
may become strategic substitutes. It is worth mentioning that many tournaments do
re-award prizes. Promotion tournaments and elections often require that somebody
claim the ﬁrst place prize, but the Olympics, which does not require that somebody
receive the gold, also typically re-awards medals4. Thus, while re-awarding prizes
may appear to be costly, it can be optimal for the tournament organizer because it
reduces enforcement costs. Re-awarding prizes is not the only way to reduce costs.
We also discuss the beneﬁts of monitoring winners and losers diﬀerently, as well as
awarding prizes for losers.
The incentive for agents to engage in undesirable activities was noted early on
in the tournament literature. Lazear (1989) remarked that the ability of agents to
sabotage each other reduces the attractiveness of tournaments. This spawned works
speciﬁcally on sabotage. Konrad (2000) drew the parallels between sabotage and
public goods provision. As the number of contestants increases, the free rider problem
becomes more severe, and the amount of sabotage decreases. Chen (2003) considered
equilibrium decisions to sabotage and demonstrated that more able contestants are
the target of more sabotage5. While Chen considered modiﬁcations to the tournament
design, such as pay equity, seniority-based promotions, and group compensation which
can reduce the incentive to sabotage, neither of these papers consider enforcement
decisions explicitly. Similarly, Epstein and Hefeker(2003) and Konrad (2005) modeled
lobbying and doping in a tournament framework as an alternative form of legal input.
There are some papers that consider enforcement in their analysis. Berentsen (2002)
and Haugen (2004) both look at doping incentives in tournament settings, but with
4In a rather interesting example, Becky Scott, a Canadian bi-athlete initially won the bronze
medal at the 2002 Winter Olympics. After one of the Russian women ahead of her tested positive
for a banned substance, she was upgraded to silver. When the other Russian woman tested positive
as well, she (after a long legal battle) was awarded the gold, marking the ﬁrst time an athlete
received the bronze, silver and gold in the same event. This case is of interest, because the Olympic
Committee debated for a long time whether it was worthwhile to issue another gold medal. This
paper suggests that it was.
5Experimental results by Harbring and al. (2004) provide support for this.
2the exclusion of eﬀort choices. Finally, in a paper most closely related to ours, Kr¨ akel
(2007) introduces eﬀort, in addition to the cheating decision via a modiﬁcation of the
Lazear and Rosen (1981) tournament. By concentrating exclusively on a tournament
with “re-awarding”, he characterizes the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
without cheating without focusing on optimal deterrence, including such issues as
multiple equilibria.
This paper combines issues of tournament design with a more traditional law
and economics approach to deterrence. That is, we consider a tournament in which
the organizer is able to monitor the contestants to try to detect cheating. If any
contestants are caught, then the principal can impose some penalty.
In the classical models of crime, as in Becker (1968), an individual’s decision to
commit crime depends only on the beneﬁt derived from the crime, the probability
of being caught, and the penalty, and does not depend on the decisions of others to
commit crime. This need not always be the case. For example, if there exist increasing
returns, then the payoﬀ to crime depends on the choices of others, and multiple
equilibria can be present. Increasing return can be attributed to congestion eﬀects
in deterrence as in Sah (1991), or due to social norms and stigma associated with
crime as described by Rasmusen (1996), or due to coordination issues surrounding
occupational choice like in Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003) and Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1993).
This paper presents a model in which two identical agents compete in a tour-
nament. They not only provide productive eﬀort, but can also engage in cheating
activities. This paper does not consider why such activities are considered undesir-
able, but assumes that they exist and that they are beneﬁcial to the agent because
they increase the chance of winning the tournament. The tournament organizer de-
ters cheating by monitoring the players and can impose a penalty when agents are
found to have cheated. We assume limited liability, so that the maximum penalty
the organizer can impose is the stripping of any prize awarded. We consider two
possible schemes for penalties. In the ﬁrst, all cheaters are simply stripped of their
prize, and losers do not get moved up in rank. In this scheme, cheating on behalf
of one agent reduces the expected prize for other contestants, thereby reducing the
3cost of cheating. Conditions are found for the existence of multiple equilibria, specif-
ically equilibria in which either both cheat or neither cheat. In the second scheme,
the ﬁrst-place prize is awarded to the person that performed best in the tournament
and was not found to have cheated. In this case, one agent’s decision to cheat may
increase the expected prize for everyone else, thereby reducing the incentive to cheat.
We ﬁnd that the minimal amount of monitoring necessary is lower when prizes are
re-awarded than when they are not whenever the beneﬁt to cheating is not simply a
reduction in eﬀort.
The notion of ensuring that neither agent cheats allows for a positive analysis of the
model that does not require specifying social costs of cheating and tradeoﬀs between
eﬀort, cheating and prizes. We examine the beneﬁts and costs of manipulating prizes,
with a particular focus on second-place prizes. We ﬁnd that second-place prizes
reduce the amount of monitoring required, but that this comes at an additional cost
of reduced eﬀort on behalf of the contestants. However, we ﬁnd that an increase
in both the ﬁrst- and second-place prizes such that the diﬀerence between them
does not change decreases the amount of monitoring required while not aﬀecting the
eﬀort exerted by contestants. Kr¨ akel (2007) also ﬁnds the ﬁrst result, but does not
consider the second. He points out that a smaller spread between the winner and loser
prizes leads to less cheating. Thus both our and Kr¨ akel’s paper provide a reason for
tournaments to not be winner-take-all. The fact that eﬀort is determined by the gap
between prizes was pointed out by Lazear and Rosen (1981), which thus implied that
the tournament organizer would want to minimize the second-place prize as much as
possible. There have been other reasons which we discuss later on, for tournaments
not to be winner-take-all. This paper provides another reason: the deterrence of
cheating. We also discuss the implication of the limited liability assumption in the
context, and explore the use of an entry fee as a way to get around limited liability.
This paper also considers the issue of diﬀerential monitoring. In particular, it
considers a scheme whereby the probability that a contestant is caught cheating de-
pends on their outcome in the tournament. Many tournaments, athletic events in
particular, monitor the winners to a greater degree than the losers. We ﬁnd that
when this is done, less total monitoring is required.
4Finally, this paper considers the possible beneﬁt to cheating when contests are
asymmetric. Speciﬁcally, it considers a tournament in which the greatest eﬀort is
expended when it is a close competition, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981), and notes
that if an equilibrium could be reached in which only low ability agents cheat, this
could lead to greater eﬀort being expended. We consider the case in which the
tournament organizer is not able to identify which agents are low ability, and ﬁnd
conditions for levels of monitoring to exist such that only low ability agents cheat in
equilibrium.
2 The Model
We consider the following model of a rank-order tournament. Two agents, 1 and 2,
both of whom are risk neutral, compete for a ﬁrst place prize, A. We allow for a second
place prize, B, that may be greater than zero. The probability that agent i wins the
tournament is partially determined by the eﬀort exerted by each of the competitors,
e1 and e2, respectively. In addition, there exists another activity that can increase
a player’s chance of winning. This other activity is not desired by the tournament
organizer in the same way as eﬀort and so shall be referred to as “cheating”. This
activity is assumed to be a binary decision so that a competitor either cheats or does
not, there is no question as to how much to cheat.
The probability that 1 wins the tournament, called the tournament success func-
tion, is given by P (e1,e2;θ1,θ2), where θi is an indicator function that takes the value
1 when i cheats and 0 when he/she does not. Thus P : R2
+ × {0,1}
2 → [0,1]. We
assume that the tournament is symmetric so that P (e,e0;θ,θ0) = 1 − P (e0,e;θ0,θ)
for all e,e0,θ,θ0, although the relaxation of this assumption is discussed in Section 7.
Let P1 (·) > 0 and P2 (·) < 0 denote the marginal eﬀects of the eﬀorts of 1 and 2,
respectively. We assume that P1 (·) = ∞ whenever e1 = 0 and P11 (·) < 0, as well as
corresponding assumptions on P2 (·).
Cheating increases the probability of winning for the cheater, so we have that
P (e1,e2;1,θ2) > P (e1,e2;0,θ2) and P (e1,e2;θ1,0) > P (e1,e2;θ1,1). Further, it is
assumed that cheating and eﬀort are separable so that an agent’s marginal eﬀect of
5eﬀort on P (·) does not depend on either θ1 and θ2.6 Finally, it is assumed that eﬀort
comes at a per unit cost of 1, while cheating is costless (aside from any potential
penalty).
Since cheating is assumed not to be a productive activity, the tournament or-
ganizer may wish to discourage it. This paper is agnostic with regards to the de-
termination of the activities that are considered cheating and to their social costs.
The organizer can monitor the participants to detect any cheating. Denote by π the
probability that the principal catches an agent who cheats. The principal can also
set the penalty for cheating. We assume limited liability on behalf of the contestants
so that the tournament organizer is not able to impose a penalty larger than the
removal of the prize. We consider two possible sanction schemes. The ﬁrst scheme
dictates that if the winner of the tournament is caught, then they are stripped of any
award. The second penalty scheme also strips the cheater of their prize (if caught
cheating), but in the case that the winner is caught, then awards the ﬁrst-place prize
to the other contestant (provided that they did get caught cheating). If both agents
are caught cheating, no prize is awarded. This latter scheme shall be referred to as
“re-awarding”.
The timing is as follows. First, the tournament organizer announces and commits
to the prizes, the probability of detection, and the penalty scheme. Agents decide
their eﬀort and whether to cheat simultaneously. A winner is determined, prizes are
awarded and the organizer audits the players for cheating. If cheaters are detected,
then the penalty is imposed. In the analysis that follows, we focus on the minimal
levels of monitoring required for each sanction scheme that induce an unique equi-
librium in which neither agent cheats. This stems in part from the desire to remain
6As will become clear later on, one feature of our model is that cheating displaces eﬀort. If
cheating and eﬀort were to be substitutes in the tournament success function, our results would
only be reinforced. It is possible that cheating and eﬀort are complementary. For example, some
steroids reduce the recovery time and enable the athletes to train more eﬃciently. If what we call
cheating was to induce more eﬀort, the principal may actually want to encourage those activities,
and no enforcement would be necessary. Of course, these activities could impose other costs for
the principal. For example, even if competition is ﬁerce, cheating may degrade the enjoyment fans
derive from a game, and consequently generate less revenue for the principal. We are abstracting
from all those issues.
6agnostic about the social costs of cheating as well as issues of equilibrium selection.
3 No Re-Awarding
We begin by considering the case in which the winner of the tournament is stripped of
the prize if they are discovered to have cheated, but the prize is not re-awarded. For
given awards and probability of detection, A, B and π respectively, each competitor’s
expected utilities are given by
EU
N
1 = (1 − θ1π)[B + P (e1,e2;θ1,θ2)(A − B)] − e1,
EU
N
2 = (1 − θ2π)[A − P (e1,e2;θ1,θ2)(A − B)] − e2.
Note that since cheating and eﬀort decisions are separable, the marginal return to
eﬀort is lower when a contestant cheats. This is because if the agent is caught, eﬀort
is wasted; eﬀort is productive only with probability 1−π. Consequently, there is less
incentive to provide eﬀort when cheating. Denote by eN
i (θ1,θ2) the optimal level of
eﬀort by agent i for a given set of cheating decisions.
Lemma 1: Each agent provides less eﬀort when both of them cheat compared to the
case in which neither cheat. That is, eN
i (0,0) ≥ eN
i (1,1), where the inequality is strict
when π > 0.
Let us now consider the equilibria to this game. First, note that each agent has
a dominant strategy to cheat when the principal does not monitor (π = 0), since
it increases the probability of winning, and does not cost anything. Further, when
π = 1 each agent has a dominant strategy to not cheat. Of interest is the minimum
level of π such that neither agent chooses to cheat as the unique equilibrium. For
simplicity, it shall be assumed that an agent does not cheat when indiﬀerent between
cheating and not.
We begin by considering the values of π for which there exists an equilibrium in
which neither agent cheats. This equilibrium may or may not be unique. In such an
equilibrium, the symmetry condition implies that each agent chooses eN
i (0,0) as their
eﬀort and each agent has a probability a half of winning the tournament. Thus the









In order for this to be an equilibrium, it must be that neither agent prefers to
cheat instead. Since the game is symmetric, we focus on agent 1 in the following
analysis, but the same reasoning can be extended to the other contestant. The payoﬀ














Denote by ˆ eN
1 (1,0) the level of eﬀort that solves this maximization problem. We





















Denote by π(0,0) the level of monitoring that solves the above equation with
equality. Note that π(0,0) is the minimal level of monitoring that supports an equi-
librium in which neither agent cheats. An equilibrium in which both agents abstain
from cheating will exist for all π ≥ π(0,0). Rewriting the above equation we have























Now consider an equilibrium in which both agents cheat. In such an equilibrium,
each agent expends eﬀort eN
i (1,1). Thus each agent’s expected payoﬀ is given by
EU
N






There exists an equilibrium in which both competitors cheat as long as neither
agent has incentive to deviate and not cheat. The payoﬀ associated with this type of
7One should note that when one contestant deviates, the eﬀort level provided by the other
agent remains unchanged. This is because we assume that both eﬀort and cheating decisions are
simultaneous. This need not be the case; it is possible to imagine an environment in which an agent’s
cheating decision is observable to the other contestant before the choice of eﬀort. This alternative
environment would yield qualitatively similar results.









(A − B) − e1.
Denote by ˆ eN
1 (0,1) the level of eﬀort that solves this maximization problem. There























Let πN(1,1) denote the level of monitoring that solves the above equation when it
holds with equality.





such that an equilibrium in which neither agent cheats and an equilibrium in which
both agents cheat co-exist. Before considering the existence of multiple equilibria
formally, it should be noted that there are two potential types of beneﬁts one de-
rives from cheating. The ﬁrst is the increase in the probability of winning directly
due to cheating. For comparable levels of eﬀort, cheating gives an edge. However,
cheaters also reduce their eﬀort, and so it is possible for the probability of coming
in ﬁrst to fall once adjusting for the change in eﬀort8. Whenever the probability of
winning the tournament increases with cheating (after allowing for eﬀort to adjust),
a particular form of externality is present. When one agent cheats, it reduces the
expected prize for the other agent, and by doing so reduces the expected penalty
associated with cheating for this second agent. Thus, the beneﬁt of cheating is not
independent of the decision of the other player. In this case, cheating decisions are
strategic complements, and multiple equilibria exist for some levels of monitoring.
We now consider the condition for multiple equilibria formally. Using equations





































8While it may seem odd to cheat if it reduces the probability of winning, it may be worthwhile
because of the reduction in eﬀort costs.
9While this condition may appear intimidating, the intuition is very straightfor-
ward. On the right hand side of the inequality, the ﬁrst term represents the change
in probability of winning the ﬁrst place prize when deviating from an equilibrium in







when 1 is the sole cheater, but only gets the prize when
not caught, which occurs with probability 1−π(0,0). The second term is the change
in eﬀort costs. Thus the right hand side represents the net beneﬁt of cheating, given
that agent 2 is not cheating and exerting eﬀort eN
1 (0,0). The left hand side similarly
depicts the net beneﬁts to cheating, but when agent 2 is also cheating and exerting
eﬀort eN
1 (1,1) < eN
1 (0,0). We thus have that multiple equilibria exist if, at π(0,0),
the beneﬁts to cheating increase in the other agent’s cheating decision. We have thus
demonstrated the following result.
Result 1: When prizes are not re-awarded, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
π(0,0) < πN(1,1) is that the marginal beneﬁt to cheating is greater when the other
competitor cheats than when she does not.
Let us consider an extreme example. First, consider the hypothetical case in which
agents’ eﬀorts are constant. That is, eN
1 (0,0) = ˆ eN
1 (0,1) = eN
1 (1,1) = ˆ eN
1 (1,0). When
this happens, we have that P(ˆ eN
1 (1,0),eN
2 (0,0);1,0) = 1 − P(ˆ eN
1 (0,1),eN
2 (1,1);0,1).

















which must be true as long as π(0,0) > 0. The intuition for this is that the expected
cost of cheating (the foregone prize) is smaller when the other agent cheats than when
s/he does not. This illustrates an important externality that is created in tournaments
when prizes are not re-awarded. Namely, an agent’s decision to cheat reduces the
expected prize for all other agents. Since the only penalty is the loss of this expected
prize, cheating on behalf of one agent thus reduces the expected sanction, which can
lead to multiple equilibria. We also wish to examine a less extreme example. Let us
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Figure 1: The upper curve represents the amount of monitoring required to eliminate
the equilibrium in which both agents cheat and the lower curve represents the amount
of monitoring required to enable an equilibrium in which neither agent cheats, as
functions of α.
Example: Let P(e1,e2;θ1,θ2) = α
e1
e1+e2 + (1 − α)
θ1
θ1+θ2, where 1 ≥ α ≥ 0 determines
the importance of cheating in winning a tournament, and where
θ1
θ1+θ2 is deﬁned as
1
2
when both agents do not cheat.
In this example, the relevant levels of eﬀort can be calculated9, as well as the
winning probabilities.10 If we let A = 1 and B = 0, Figure 1 reveals that πN(1,1)
is greater than π(0,0) for all values of α less than 1. Obviously, when α = 1, no
enforcement is needed since cheating is useless. On the other hand, when α = 0
cheating is the only thing that determines the winner. If agent two cheats, agent
one is losing with probability one, so the probability of detection, πN(1,1), has to
be equal to one. If agent 2 does not cheat, agent 1’s expected payoﬀ is 1
2 when not
cheating, so the probability of detection, π(0,0), only needs to be 1
2. ￿
Whenever there exist multiple equilibria, the minimum level of monitoring re-
9They are eN
i (0,0) = αA−B
4 , eN
i (1,1) = α(1 − π)A−B
4 , ˆ eN











1 (0,1) = ˆ eN







10The probabilities of winning are P(0,0) = P(1,1) = 1

















11quired to ensure that neither agent cheats is πN(1,1) > π(0,0). If monitoring was
to be anywhere between those two cutoﬀ points, contestants may still coordinate on
the equilibrium in which both cheat. If multiple equilibria are not present, choosing
π ≥ π(0,0) > πN(1,1) is suﬃcient to prevent cheating. It is worth mentioning at this
point that this result can be generalized to a continuous cheating decision. While the
issue of multiple equilibria may or may not be present when the decision to cheat is
a continuous one, an increase in cheating by one of the contestants would still have
the eﬀect of reducing the expected penalty for the other. Thus cheating decisions
would still be strategic complements, and a greater degree of monitoring would still
be required.
We now consider the case in which the winner of the tournament is stripped of
the prize if they are discovered to have cheated and the prize is then given to the
other contestant, provided they were not found to have cheated as well.
4 Re-Awarding
When prizes are re-awarded, there exists an additional means for a competitor to
win the ﬁrst place prize. Now, an agent wins the tournament (assuming they are not




1 (θ1,θ2) = (1 − θ1π)(B + [(1 − θ2π)P (e1,e2,θ1,θ2) + θ2π][A − B]) − e1,
EU
R
2 (θ1,θ2) = (1 − θ2π)(A − (1 − θ1π)P (e1,e2,θ1,θ2)[A − B]) − e2.
We begin by noting that if an agent cheats, it aﬀects the marginal return to eﬀort
for both competitors. As before, when an agent cheats there is a chance that s/he
will be caught, and any eﬀort expended essentially goes to waste. When the prize is
re-awarded, the agent that is not caught automatically wins the ﬁrst place prize, and
so their eﬀort also has no impact on the outcome. The following Lemma describes
the relation between eﬀort levels and compares them to the eﬀort levels described
above when the prize is not re-awarded.
Lemma 2: Agents exert more eﬀort when neither cheat as compared to the case in
12which only one agent cheats. Agents exert the least amount of eﬀort when both cheat.
Consequently, eR
i (0,0) ≥ eR
i (1,0) = eR
i (0,1) ≥ eR(1,1), where all inequalities are
strict when π > 0.
Note that when neither agent cheats, they exert the same amount of eﬀort as
when the prize is not re-awarded. We shall thus refer to this eﬀort level as simply
e(0,0). More interestingly, we note that agents exert the same eﬀort when one agent
cheats and the prize is re-awarded as when the prize is not re-awarded and both
agents cheat. That is eR
i (1,0) = eR
i (0,1) = eN
i (1,1). It should further be noted that,
in addition to the direct cost of re-awarding the prize, this system also produces less
eﬀort (as compared to no re-awarding) in all equilibria in which some cheating takes
place. However, in the equilibrium in which neither agent cheats, there are neither
greater prize costs nor eﬀort displacement.
Let us consider the equilibria to this game. First, we note that re-awarding leads
to a diﬀerence in an agent’s payoﬀ only when the other competitor cheats. Thus
the condition for the existence of an equilibrium without cheating remains the same.
That is, there exists an equilibrium with no cheating for all π ≥ π(0,0). However,
when the other competitor cheats, there now exists an additional means to win the
ﬁrst place prize. Notably, we have that each agent’s expected payoﬀ in an equilibrium
in which both agents cheat is given by
EU
R












There exists an equilibrium in which both competitors cheat as long as neither














(A − B) − e1.
Denote the solution to this maximization problem by ˆ eR
1 (0,1). The condition for the





























Let πR(1,1) be the solution to the above equation when it holds with equality.
13Since this paper is interested in the minimal level of monitoring required to ensure
that neither agent cheats, we again seek to ﬁnd conditions such that both types of
equilibria exist for a given level of enforcement. Combining equations 3.1 and 4.1











































The right hand side of the equation is the marginal beneﬁt of cheating given that the
other agent is not. The left hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of cheating when the
other agent is also cheating11 We have thus proved the following result.
Result 2: When prizes are re-awarded, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
π(0,0) < πR(1,1) is that the beneﬁt to cheating be greater when the other agent
cheats than when s/he does not.
While this result is in many ways similar to Result 1 when there is no re-awarding,
there are important diﬀerences. To compare the two results, we ﬁrst refer to the two
extreme examples used in the last section. Recall that if the contestant’s eﬀort levels
were constant for all cheating proﬁles, there existed amounts of monitoring that lead
to multiple equilibria when prizes were not re-awarded. With re-awarding this is no
longer true; whenever the equilibrium with no cheating exists, it is always unique.





which never holds. Thus when the equilibrium in which neither agent cheats exists,
it is unique. Recall that, when prizes are not re-awarded, cheating on behalf of
one agent reduces the expected penalty for the other. Thus the agents’ decisions to
cheat are strategic complements. When prizes are re-awarded, however, an agent’s
decision to cheat creates another means for the other agent to win the ﬁrst place
prize. Furthermore, if the level of monitoring is suﬃcient to deter the an agent from
11The left hand side can be obtained from a rearrangement of EUR(1,1) − EUR(0,1).
14cheating when the other is not, then we have that this other means of winning is
suﬃcient to make the expected penalty increase when the other agent cheats. The
other example we considered was a modiﬁcation of the Tullock contest.
Example: Let P(e1,e2;θ1,θ2) = α
e1







agents do not cheat.
As when prizes are not re-awarded, eﬀort levels12, and winning probabilities13 can
be easily calculated.
It is interesting to notice that all probabilities of winning are exactly the same as
for the no re-awarding case. The problem faced by a contestant when the other agent
is not cheating, is exactly the same no matter if the prizes are re-awarded or not. All
eﬀort levels and probabilities of winning are naturally going to be the same. That is
precisely why π(0,0) is the same in both cases. The eﬀort level chosen by a contestant
when the other contestant cheats does depend on whether prizes are re-awarded, and
so the probability of winning could also depend on the regime. However, since in the
Tullock contest, eﬀort levels vary proportionally when agents decide to cheat across
the two enforcement regimes, the probabilities of winning the tournament are the
same in both cases. Using the same numerical example where A = 1 and B = 0, it
is possible to see that multiple equilibria no longer exist when prizes are re-awarded.
Figure 2 represents the levels of monitoring required to eliminate both cheating and
establish neither cheating as equilibria. Contrary to the case with no re-awarding,
π(0,0) is always above πR(1,1). When α = 1, cheating does not contribute so both
probabilities of detection are equal to zero. However when α = 0, contestants always
want to cheat without re-awarding, no matter what the other agent is doing, so
πN(1,1) must be equal to one. With re-awarding, if the probability of getting caught
was 1, a contestant would never want to cheat when the other does.
While the issue of multiple equilibria may be of interest by itself, it very important
to deterrence. Speciﬁcally, it is important to the minimum level of enforcement that
12Eﬀort levels are given by eR
i (0,0) = αA−B
4 , eR
i (1,1) = α(1 − π)2 A−B
4 , ˆ eR






4 and ˆ eR
1 (0,1) = ˆ eR







13The winning probabilities are given by P(0,0) = P(1,1) = 1
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Figure 2: The upper curve represents the amount of monitoring required to enable an
equilibrium in which neither agent cheats and the lower curve represents the amount
of monitoring required to eliminate the equilibrium in which both agents cheat, as
functions of α.
guarantees no cheating. With this in mind, we can now analyze the eﬀect that re-
awarding prizes has on deterrence.
Recall that, in any equilibrium in which neither agent cheats, we have that
eN
i (0,0) = eR
i (0,0) = e(0,0). Further, we have that ˆ eN(1,0) = ˆ eR(1,0) = ˆ e(1,0).
We also know that π(0,0) is independent of the re-awarding structure. Let us now
consider a comparison of πN(1,1) and πR(1,1). Recall that equation 3.2 character-
izes πN(1,1) when it holds with equality. We have πR(1,1) from equation 4.1 when

















































which simply states that the marginal beneﬁt to cheating is greater when prizes are
not re-awarded than when they are.
Note that re-awarding increases the payoﬀ to agents when they both cheat. First,
it provides an extra avenue to winning the ﬁrst place prize. Second, agents exert
less eﬀort when the prize is re-awarded than when it is not. However, re-awarding
16also increases the payoﬀ to deviating from such an equilibrium by not cheating when
the other agent does, and this increase happens through the same means. Whether
re-awarding increases or decreases the marginal beneﬁt to cheating thus depends on
which eﬀect dominates. Intuitively, re-awarding should have a greater impact when
not cheating (and the other agent is), because the agent does not have to discount
this way of winning by the probability that s/he is not caught as well.
More formally, let us consider the beneﬁt to cheating when there is re-awarding.
This beneﬁt, denoted by β, is given by
β = max
e1





B + [(1 − π)P (e1,e2;0,1) + π](A − B) − e1
￿
Note that these maximization problems can be rewritten as follows.
β = max
e1





B + P (e1,e2;0,1)(A − B) + π [1 − P (e1,e2;0,1)](A − B) − e1
￿
By writing the maximization problems this way, we have isolated a term that rep-
resents the gain from winning the prize through re-awarding. In the ﬁrst maximiza-
tion problem (choosing to cheat when the other agent is also cheating), this term
is π [1 − P (e1,e2;1,1)](A − B). We now consider multiplying these terms by θ. If
θ = 0, then we have the beneﬁt of cheating when there is no re-awarding, and when
θ = 1, we have the beneﬁt when prizes are re-awarded. In order to see the eﬀect that
re-awarding has on the beneﬁt to cheating, we need only take the derivative with













Note that both π and A − B are positive. It is easy to show that
∂e2
∂θ is negative, as
is P2. Thus a suﬃcient condition for this to be negative is P (e1,e2;0,1) < 1
2, which
states that cheaters have a greater chance of winning the tournament. We have thus
demonstrated the following result.
Result 3: The necessary and suﬃcient condition for πN(1,1) > πR(1,1) is







17A suﬃcient condition is that cheaters have a greater probability of winning the tour-
nament (P (ˆ e1(0,1),e2(1,1);0,1) < 1
2).
A corollary to this result is that the tournament organizer needs to monitor
(weakly) less when re-awarding prizes than when not. If the equilibrium in which
neither agent cheats is unique when it exists without re-awarding, then this result
demonstrates that it will also be unique with re-awarding. In this case, the tourna-
ment organizer need only monitor with π(0,0) for either sanction scheme. However, if
multiple equilibria exist when prizes are not re-awarded, then the organizer needs to
monitor with πN(1,1) in order to ensure a lack of cheating. By re-awarding, either the
cheating equilibrium will be eliminated so that monitoring with π(0,0) is suﬃcient to
ensure no cheating, or the tournament organizer can monitor with πR(1,1) < πN(1,1).
Thus re-awarding can save on monitoring costs.
The above result establishes a reason for tournament organizers to re-award prizes.
The next section considers the eﬀect that the prizes themselves have on the amount
of monitoring required.
5 Winner Take All, Entry Fees and Other Features
Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Tullock (1980) both pointed out that eﬀort is a function
of the gap between the ﬁrst-place and second-place prizes. In particular, it has been
noted that winner-take-all formats induce maximal eﬀort at the lowest cost. This
stems from the ﬁrst order conditions for eﬀort, which depend on A−B. Consequently,
there is no value to oﬀering generous second prizes(or third and so on) in such a simple
environment. However, in reality we often observe contests which do not adopt the
winner-take-all approach; the Olympics with gold, silver and bronze medals being
an obvious example. Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Singh and Wittman (2000) and
Szymanski and Vallentti (2005) rationalized the existence of more than one prize by
the incentives that the additional prizes create when participants are heterogeneous
in their probability of winning a tournament. For example, in an 8-person heat of a
race, if one contestant is heavily favored to win, the others will have more incentive
to exert eﬀort if there is a second-place prize. It should be noted that neither of the
18above papers suggest that if there are N contestants, then there should be N prizes.
In this paper, there are 2 symmetric risk neutral contestants, yet there still exists a
rationale for a second-place prize.
Consider an environment in which multiple equilibria are not present. Choosing a
probability of detection equal to π(0,0) is thus suﬃcient to prevent cheating. Suppose
that B were to increase and A were to stay the same. In this case, the beneﬁts to
coming in ﬁrst have decreased but the expected prize will have increased. Thus the
cost to cheating will have increased, and the tournament organizer will be able to
monitor less in order to obtain a non-cheating equilibrium. However, recall that in
any equilibrium in which no cheating occurs, eﬀort depends on A − B. Thus the
reduction in monitoring will have come at the cost of reduced eﬀort. Now consider an
increase in A, holding B constant. The expected prize will have again increased, but
now the beneﬁts to coming in ﬁrst will also have increased. The eﬀect on monitoring
is therefore ambiguous. The following Lemma demonstrates this formally.
Lemma 3:When π(0,0) is suﬃcient to deter cheating, an increase in B will reduce
the amount of monitoring required and an increase in A has an ambiguous eﬀect.
That is,
∂π(0,0)
∂B < 0 and
∂π(0,0)
∂A may be either positive or negative.
Kr¨ akel (2007) ﬁnds a result similar to the above lemma, but does not fully con-
sider the impact of prizes on monitoring costs. Both papers assume limited liability.
Without this assumption, the incentive to cheat would simply be an increasing func-
tion of A−B. Tournament organizers would have no reason to oﬀer a second prize B.
Tournaments would be winner take all, and maximal ﬁnes or punishments would be
imposed on cheaters and contestants would be monitored as little as possible, as in
the standard Becker (1968) result. With limited liability, the expected punishment is
the expected prize. Since eﬀort depends on A−B, if both A and B were to increase,
but the diﬀerence between them was unchanged, there would be no eﬀect on eﬀort.
However, the expected prize, and therefore the expected penalty, would increase. This
would enable the tournament organizer to decrease monitoring and still obtain the
non-cheating equilibrium, as demonstrated in the following Result.
Result 4:Increasing A and B such that A − B remains constant leads to the same
eﬀort provided by both agents (in the equilibrium with no cheating), but reduces π(0,0).
19Increasing both prizes is equivalent to increasing the sanction associated with
cheating. The tournament organizer gives something that can be taken away when
bad behavior is detected. Thus if monitoring is particularly costly, the organizer may
ﬁnd it cheaper to oﬀer larger prizes than to increase monitoring in order to prevent
agents from cheating. The same results can be derived for πN(1,1) and πR(1,1).
If the tournament organizer is able to charge entry fees, however, then it may
actually end up to be costless for the organizer to reduce monitoring costs in this
fashion. An entry fee would not inﬂuence eﬀort choices, nor would it aﬀect the
incentives to cheat, all else equal. An entry fee, however, could be used to fund
increases in both A and B. That is, the entry fee acts as a bond that contestants
post before the tournament and do not get back if they are caught cheating. If
the diﬀerence between the two prizes were held the same, then eﬀorts would be the
same, each agent’s expected payoﬀ (net of the entry fee) would be the same, but the
organizer could spend less on monitoring costs14.
6 Diﬀerential Monitoring
The analysis thus far has assumed that the tournament organizer must monitor both
competitors the same. That is, there exists a single π that represents the probability
that a cheating competitor is caught. This need not be the case. For example, when
prizes are not re-awarded, one could ensure the equilibrium in which neither agent
cheats in the unique equilibrium by setting the level of monitoring for competitor 1
at π(0,0) and for competitor 2 at πN(1,1). If this were done, agent 2 would not be
willing to cheat no matter whether 1 were cheating or not. Agent 1 would be willing
to cheat if 2 were cheating, but not if 2 is not cheating. Since 2 deﬁnitely will not
cheat, 1 will also not cheat. In this manner, the organizer could achieve the same
equilibrium with less total monitoring.
A more common form of diﬀerential monitoring is to check for cheating after the
outcome of the tournament has been realized and to monitor the winner to a greater
degree than the loser. For example, urine tests are mandatory for Olympic medal
14We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
20winners but occur only with some probability for other athletes15 By doing so, the
organizer can exploit the fact that when multiple equilibria are present, deterring one
agent from cheating helps deter the other. However, this is not the only beneﬁt of
diﬀerential monitoring. Since cheating increases one’s chances of winning, additional
monitoring of the winner has a greater impact on one’s decision to cheat. As a
result, a tournament organizer can reduce the total amount of monitoring required
by monitoring the winner more than the loser. This is true even when multiple
equilibria are not present. It should be noted that the second eﬀect is similar to the
rank-based punishment strategy proposed by Berentsen (2002).
As in the last section, we only consider the case in which the prize is not re-
awarded. Let πW and πL denote the monitoring of the winner and loser of the
tournament, respectively. When an agent does not cheat, his/her choice of eﬀort






∂πL = 0, with equivalent
results for 2’s eﬀort. When an agent does cheat, eﬀort does depend on the amount of
monitoring. Given agent 2’s eﬀort, 1’s choice of eﬀort is determined by
￿
(1 − π




With diﬀerential monitoring, the two probabilities of detection have diﬀering impacts
on eﬀort. In particular, an increase in πW discourages eﬀort while an increase in πL
encourages it. Contingent on cheating, an increase in πW makes it less attractive to
win due to the increase in the expected punishment. On the other hand, and increase
in πL, stimulates eﬀort because losing implies a greater chance of being punished.
Let us consider an environment in which multiple equilibria is not a concern. The








































15Note that this does not mean that medal winners are caught with probability one.
21When ∂πW
∂πL > −1, we have that it is possible to increase the monitoring of the
winner by less than the decrease of the monitoring of the loser and still maintain an



























2, which states that cheaters
have a greater chance of winning the contest, even after they reduce their eﬀort.
7 Asymmetric Contests
Going back as far as Lazear and Rosen (1981), it is well understood that when con-
testants’ abilities diﬀer, eﬀort choices may not be eﬃcient. Intuitively, if one agent
has a considerably advantage in winning the tournament, there is not much incentive
to provide eﬀort for any contestant16. The race is already won before it starts. If this
variation in ability is observable to the tournament organizer, there are many ways
to deal with this problem. For example, contestants could be sorted out into skill
categories, or a handicapped form of tournament could be designed such that a high
ability contestant needs to show an output suﬃciently higher than a lower ability
contestant’s in order to win. The ability of the contestants being observable to the
organizer is a strong assumption, however. Akerlof and Holden (2006) show that even
if a tournament organizer could perfectly monitor contestants’ output and without
cost, it may not be desirable to do so. By constructing a tournament where mistakes
are made in the allocation of the prizes (with suﬃcient probability, but also not too
frequently), it increases the chance that a low ability individual wins the tournament,
which in turn increases the incentive to provide eﬀort. Our interpretation of this re-
sult is that making mistakes can level the playing ﬁeld enough to make it worthwhile
competing.
The introduction of cheating makes for an interesting extension of the above re-
sults. When tournaments are symmetric, cheating displaces eﬀort. When tourna-
16In Lazear and Rosen’s model, it is assumed that the marginal return to eﬀort is greatest when
the odds of winning are even.
22ments are asymmetric, however, cheating can level the playing ﬁeld, thereby promot-
ing eﬀort. Speciﬁcally, if low ability agents were allowed to cheat more than high
ability agents, by monitoring them less for example, the competition could become
closer, thereby increasing increasing the incentive to exert eﬀort. Obviously, this
would again require that ability is observable. When ability is unobservable, an ar-
gument similar to Akerlof and Holden can be made. If the tournament organizer is
able to set a uniform monitoring system so that low ability individuals are the only
ones how have incentive to cheat, then eﬀort by all agents could increase.
We will now use a simple example to show how is it possible to have an equilibrium
in which only low ability individuals cheat. To simplify the analysis, we consider a
model without eﬀort. While it may seem an inappropriate assumption, given that
the point is to stimulate eﬀort, it makes the intuition clear. It will be easy to see
what eﬀect eﬀort would have if this assumption were to be relaxed after establishing
the intuition. Suppose that the ﬁrst agent is high ability and has a probability of
winning the tournament of γ ∈ [0.5,0.75]. Further suppose that cheating increases
the probability of winning by θ ∈ [0,0.25]. As before, the probability of detection
is π and the ﬁrst and second place prizes are A and B. We consider only the case
without re-awarding. In this simple 2 × 2 game, an equilibrium in which only agent
2 cheats exists when π satisﬁes
θ(A − B)
B + γ(A − B)
< π <
θ(A − B)
A − (γ − θ)(A − B)
.
Note that such a π exists as long as B+γ (A − B) > A−(γ − θ)(A − B), or 2γ > 1+θ.
Intuitively, an equilibrium in which only the low ability agent cheats can exist only
when cheating narrows the gap between the two agents, but doesn’t overcome 1’s
natural advantage. It should further be noted that when this equilibrium exists, it is
unique. The condition for only agent 1 to cheat is that 1−θ > 2γ, which is never true.
With regards to eﬀort, we have that agent 1 will increase eﬀort because of the tighter
race, while the eﬀect is ambiguous for agent 2. Agent 2 will want to decrease eﬀort
because of the tighter race, but will want to decrease eﬀort because of the probability
of getting caught. As long as agent 1 still has the greater probability of winning after
the net eﬀects of eﬀort, it will still be the case that an equilibrium exists in which
only agent 2 cheats.
238 Conclusion
This paper examines diﬀerent issues that arise when a tournament organizer wants to
discourage participants from undertaking activities (which we refer to as “cheating”)
that increase their chances of winning, but that are undesirable. Cheating is deterred
with the standard detection and punishment scheme, although a speciﬁc form of
limited liability is assumed - the tournament organizer can only conﬁscate any earned
prize. A main result centers on the potential for multiple equilibria. We demonstrate
that the tournament environment creates an externality between competitors in their
cheating decisions, and so for a given enforcement eﬀort, no cheating or both agents
cheating may both be equilibria. We focus on the minimum level of enforcement
that would deter cheating with probability one, and then look at ways a tournament
organizer can reduce the monitoring intensity and still achieve the same goal.
When a participant is caught cheating and his/her prize been stripped, the tour-
nament organizer faces the choice of re-awarding the prize or not. Given that many
prizes are costly, it might seem that the tournament organizer would be better oﬀ
by keeping the conﬁscated prize, but in reality re-awarding is the norm. This paper
demonstrates that re-awarding prizes inﬂuences that nature of the externality asso-
ciated with cheating. When a participant cheats, the other participant can win just
by the fact that the cheater is being caught. The resulting positive externality not
only reduces the possibility for multiple equilibria, but also reduces the monitoring
necessary to ensure no cheating. Consequently, a tournament organizer can trade oﬀ
the cost of monitoring with the cost of re-awarding a prize.
Awarding a second-place prize, even with only two contestants, is also a way
save on monitoring costs. The presence of a second-place prize increases the cost of
cheating and consequently reduces the incentive do to so. Finally, the tournament
organizer can reduce monitoring costs by assigning diﬀerent probabilities of detection
to the diﬀerent agents. Speciﬁcally, if the winner is caught with a higher probability
than the loser, the incentive to win by cheating is reduced.
An important feature of this paper is that it focuses on the equilibriumin which no
cheating takes place. In reality, a tournament organizer might be willing to tradeoﬀ
24costs arising from cheating with prize and monitoring costs. To be properly able to an-
alyze such a problem, one would need a formal objective function for the tournament
organizer, something this paper did not undertake in order to focus on the positive
aspects of enforcement. Such a question would certainly be worthy of exploration.
What would be the objective function of a tournament organizer be in this context?
In other models, the organizer is assume to care about output which is a function of
eﬀort and a random component. If this is the sole objective, cheating would be unde-
sirable if it displaces eﬀort, or in the case of sabotage, destroys the productive eﬀorts
of others. Re-awarding, oﬀering a second-place prizes and diﬀerential monitoring all
reduce eﬀorts, but save on monitoring costs. However, is the displacement of eﬀort
the only cost to cheating? Steroid uses increases the speed of sprinters, the number
of home runs hit or the top weight lifted, but can also have many negative eﬀects. It
can jeopardize contestants’ future heath, render comparisons of performance impos-
sible (such as the comparison of Barry Bonds and Babe Ruth), or diminish interest
in the competition. For example, a July 8, 2002 USA Today poll showed that 86% of
baseball fans claim that compulsory testing for steroids would renew their interest in
baseball. How these diﬀerent costs enter the tournament organizer’s objective func-
tion would dictate the optimal levels of enforcement, eﬀort, and cheating. We hope
that this paper would stimulate research interest on these types of questions.
259 Appendix
Proof to Lemma 1: First, let us consider the two maximization problems for a
given cheating proﬁle, (θ1,θ2).
max
e1
(1 − θ1π)[B + P (e1,e2;θ1,θ2)(A − B)] − e1,
max
e2
(1 − θ2π)[A− P (e1,e2;θ1,θ2)(A − B)] − e2
With the separability assumption, the two ﬁrst order conditions are given by
(1 − θ1π)P1 (e1,e2)(A − B) − 1 = 0,
−(1 − θ2π)P2 (e1,e2)(A − B) − 1 = 0.
By symmetry, however, we have that P1 (·) = −P2 (·), and so we have that agent i’s
ﬁrst order condition is
(1 − θiπ)P1 (e1,e2)(A − B) − 1 = 0.
Consider i’s choice of eﬀort when θ1 = θ2 = 0. The ﬁrst order conditions reveal that




(A − B) = 1
Now consider i’s choice of eﬀort when θ1 = θ2 = 1. Again, the ﬁrst order conditions





1. For all π > 0 it is the case that eN
i (0,0) > eN
i (1,1). ￿
Proof to Lemma 2: With the separability assumption, the two ﬁrst order conditions
are given by
(1 − θ1π)(1 − θ2π)P1 (e1,e2)(A − B) = 1
−(1 − θ1π)(1 − θ2π)P2 (e1,e2)(A − B) = 1
Consider i’s choice of eﬀort when θ1 = θ2 = 0. By symmetry, we have that when





(A − B) = 1. Note that eR(0,0) = eN(0,0).
Now consider i’s choice of eﬀort when θ1 = θ2 = 1. Again, the ﬁrst order conditions re-





B) = 1. For all π > 0, it is the case that eR(0,0) > eR(1,1).
When only one agent cheats, the FOC for both agent are givenby (1−π)P1 (e1,e2)(A−
B) = 1. This implies that eR(1,0) = eR(0,1) = eN(1,1). ￿
26Proof to Lemma 3: To shorten the notation in this proof, denote P (ˆ e(1,0),e(0,0);1,0)
simply by P(1,0). We ﬁrst solve for
∂π(0,0)
∂A . Applying the Implicit Function and The-










∂A [1 + (1 − π(0,0))P2 (1,0)(A − B)]
B + P (1,0)(A − B)
Note that the denominator is positive. Inthe numerator, the ﬁrst term
￿
1
2 − (1 − π(0,0))P (1,0)
￿
may be either positive or negative. The second term,
∂e(0,0)
∂A > 0, but [1 + (1 − π(0,0))P2 (1,0)(A − B)]
may be either positive or negative. Thus the eﬀect is ambiguous.
A similar exercise with respect to B, and noting that
∂eN
2 (0,0)








∂B [1 − (1 − π(0,0))P2 (1,0)(A − B)]
B + P(1,0)(A − B)
< 0
￿
Proof to Result 4: The fact that eﬀort remains the same in the non-cheating
equilibrium follows directly from the ﬁrst order conditions. To examine the eﬀect on





































∂A (1 − π(0,0)))P2(1,0)(A − B)
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